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EVOLUTION AND THE LAW
EVOLUTION AND THE LAW.
By JACOB MARK LASHIY.*
Whether the trial of a religious issue in a court of justice ever
satisfies anybody or settles anything is questionable, but the introduc-
tion of biology into court in the trial of John T. Scopes, a hitherto
obscure teacher at Dayton, Tennessee, has at least resulted in nation-
wide discussion of the subject of Evolution and has fired the forces
in the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy with renewed zeal for
their respective sides.
But this case presented a very important legal as well as religious
question, and there appears to arise a danger that some of the sincere
and devoted exponents of the cause of Fundamental Religion may fall
into an embarrassing difficulty by unwittingly allowing the two questions
to become coupled together in their thinking and in their public utter-
ances, so that should they in course of time find themselves arrayed
upon the wrong side of the legal quesiion they may unhappily find their
influence upon the side of the religious question undeservedly dimin-
ished. For the legal question is susceptible of precise and final deter-
mination and is a matter for lawyers and the courts, whereas, by its
very nature the doctrinal question is not, and is a matter for scientists,
philosophers and theologians.
The indictment against the diffusion of the doctrine of Evolution
is that it contradicts the principles of religion in the Bible story of
creation and presently leads to general unbelief. When we consider
the experience of Charles Darwin and his able and ardent disciples,
Haeckel and Herbert Spencer, as well as Huxley, John Stuart Mill and
even H. G. Wells, how they emerged from their studies and experi-
ments in science absent that simple faith in God as the First Cause
which has satisfied the minds and hearts of men of all degrees through-
out the centuries, there would seem to be serious ground for the charge.
As Charles Darwin, educated for the ministry, phrased his own experi-
ence: "Disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last
complete. The rate was so slow that I felt no distress." Even the
fact that Mr. Darrow, who describes himself as an agnostic, was the
leading counsel for Scopes and chief reliance of the Modernists at the
Tennessee trial, seems to have deepened the popular suspicion that
the intensive study of this branch of science generally results in agnos-
ticism. A professor occupying the chair of psychology in one of our
*Lecturer on Bankruptcy, Washington University School of Law.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
great universities said to the writer, "When you enter the door of
psychology, you hang your religion outside." This laconic and reveal-
ing remark appears quite as applicable to the era which has just closed
in the field of biology. Moreover, it cannot be doubted that the teach-
ing of the doctrine of Evolution as an established fact to children of
immature minds in such way as to contradict the Bible version of crea-
tion, resulting in the beginnings of incredulity and irreverence, is a
matter of grave concern to parents. Upon the other hand there is
already to be observed the dawn of a better understanding, and a
place is being found in Christian thinking for the Evolutionary theory
as an inferential description of the physical method or detail of the
process of creation, unopposed to the Bible account of the Authorship
of God. As Dr. Thomson has expressed it: "Modern investigation has
shown the possibility of an evolution of matter," but he significantly
adds, "it looks as if the creation had been, as we should say in human
affairs, 'well thought out."'
The differences which divide us resolve themselves largely into
questions of proof. The same facts presented in precisely the same way
frequently produce widely different impressions upon men of the same
general experiences and walks in life. This is a fact well within the
experience of every trial lawyer. But the "kivver-to-kivver" Funda-
mentalist is not without substantial support for the claim that the ob-
servable results of especial devotion to this branch of scientific inves-
tigation have in the past been a tendency away from religion.
The psychology underlying this fact savors of a certain egotistical
development which accompanies and is in a measure peculiar to this
field of study, tending toward an inordinate growth of intellectual self-
sufficiency, which often seems to limit the horizon of its subject to
science only instead of science plus God.
The resultant tendency toward pride of intellect inclines the
student to rely more and more upon demonstrable evidence and to
withhold his assent from religious interpretations formerly accepted
as a matter of course. Being unable in the last analysis to satisfy the
exactions of his intellect by concrete and material proofs of the infinite
truths concerning the derivation and destiny of man, as well his mortal
body as his immortal soul, he has turned agnostic.
In vain does the Christian religion hold out to him that treasure
which was defined by the great apostle as "a comfortable assurance of
attaining the hope of the human heart-an inflexible conviction of
things unseen." Having chosen the more intellectual part, he too often
achieves a contempt for the sacred beliefs of his less scholarly fellow-
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men whose saintly lives may bear the strongest testimony of the effi-
ciency of their religion to satisfy every need of this life and to train
the spiritual personality for the life to come.
Let it, therefore, be freely conceded for all the purposes of this
discussion that the end intended to be promoted by legislation con-
trived to suppress the spread of the Evolution hypothesis holds much
that is desirable, but the question remains as to whether such an end
is to be advanced by means of prohibitory and suppressive laws rather
than by the processes of education and reason.
Much of the comment emanating in these days from the Funda-
mentalist side of the argument may be summarized in the words of a
leading New York clergyman in a recent widely circulated article.
He puts it thus:
"No fair-minded person can find any fault with the Day-
ton trial from a legal standpoint. The Tennessee Legislature
had enacted a statute which was clear and explicit. In effect
this law said that the teaching of Evolution in any of the
schools of the State was forbidden, on the ground that it was
contrary to the statement of creation as it appears in the
Book of Genesis. Mr. Scopes acknowledged that he had
violated this law. That ended the case."
But does the case end here? It were better stated that the legal
phases of the case begin at this point.
It was contended by counsel for Scopes that the statute of Ten-
nessee, under which he was being prosecuted, is unconstitutional and
void for two reasons:
First-It is in violation of the Constitution of Tennessee, and
Second-Such an enactment by the Legislature of any state is
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The question then is not whether the Tennessee statute was vio-
lated by one Scopes, but whether the Legislature of a state in the
exercise of its undoubted power to provide and regulate a curriculum
for the schools of the state may resort to the expedient of direct man-
datory control over the religious opinions and utterances of the teacher.
The statute of Tennessee, which was enacted in March, 1925,
under which Scopes was prosecuted, is in the following language:
"An act prohibiting the teaching of the Evolution The-
ory in all the Universities, Normals, and all other Public
Schools of Tennessee, which are supported in whole or in part
by the public school funds of the State, and to provide penal-
ties for the violations thereof.
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Section 1. Be It Enacted by the General Assembly of the
State of Tennessee, That it shall be unlawful for any teacher
in any of the Universities, Normals, and all other public
schools of the State which are supported in whole or in part
by the public school funds of the State, to teach any theory
that denies the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught
in the Bible, and to teach instead that man descended from
a lower order of animals.
Section 2. Be It Further Enacted, That any teacher
found guilty of the violation of this Act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than
One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars nor more than Five Hun-
dred ($500.00) Dollars for each offense.
Section 3. Be It Further Enacted, That this Act take
effect from and after its passage, the public welfare requir-
ing it."
The Constitution of the state provides, among other things, that
"no human authority can in any case whatever control or interfere
with the rights of conscience" of its people. Let us first examine the
validity of this statute when measured by the limitation of the fore-
going provision found in the Constitution of Tennessee.
If Mr. Scopes undertook an employment under a valid and law.
ful contract with the Board of Education to teach the subject of
biology, he had the right to teach it as well as the duty. Nor could he
be compelled by law to teach it only in accordance with a prescribed
religious doctrine, assuming that such doctrine contradicted his con-
scientious opinion and belief upon that subject, without an obnoxious
interference with his "right of conscience."
Furthermore, if the doctrine of Fundamentalism can arbitrarily be
made a state doctrine, both logic and reason constrain the observation
that a Protestant legislature, for example, could provide by law for
the teaching of the History of the Reformation, including a penalty
for failure of the teacher to agree with the theses of Luther. A con-
scientious Catholic teacher would in that case be obliged to choose the
course of dishonor and cowardice or resign. On the other hand, a
Catholic legislature could, if they saw fit, pass a law requiring, under
penalties, the teaching in the public schools of the doctrine of tran-
substantiation as a fact. Such a consummation is obviously in gross
repugnance to the whole temper and spirit of the American Republic
and tends to tear down the ideals which have beckoned to our shores
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the oppressed of every land and have given to the world a priceless
example of freedom.
It would therefore seem rather obvious that if "liberty of con-
science" means anything at all, it would be "interfered with," within
the meaning of the Constitution of Tennessee, by such a law.
But an even more far-reaching question is that of the relation
of such a law to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States:
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
This great rampart of human liberty was frankly enacted in order
to accomplish social liberty for the negroes, but the broad scope of
its provisions was intended too by the radical Republican group which
secured its ratification, at the bitterest period of the Civil War, to curb
the encroachments of the states upon the civil and conscientious lib-
erties of the freedmen under whatever guise or form.
Perhaps there is no part of the American Constitution which has
played such an heroic role in safeguarding the liberties of the people
and in the preservation of the genius of the American institution as
the Fourteenth Amendment. It alone has earned the remark so aptly
applied by Mr. Bryce to the whole document in saying "the American
Constitution deserves the veneration with which the Americans have
been accustomed to regard it."
Since the day of the promulgation of the decision in the Great
Slaughter House cases,' there is no limit at all to the "personal liberties"
which have clutched at its skirts for protection. Moreover, it may be
added, that not all of the decisions of the highest court have been
altogether understandable as they have sought to define the boundaries
beyond which the state cannot pass in regulating the conduct of its
citizens, without abridging their privileges or immunities as citizens
of the United States. But the policy of the court is undoubtedly dis-
cernible through them all. It has uniformly and consistently stricken
down those acts of the various states which have aimed at arbitrary
dictation to the people of their modes of speech, religion or the details
of their private lives where the relevancy to the subject of the peace
and safety of the state or nation does not plainly appear. This has
been the policy of the government from the earliest days of its exist-
1. 83 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 395 (1873).
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ence. Never was the Union so seriously threatened with dissolution
until the very hour of the Civil War as when the great indignant pro-
test of the people, led by Thomas Jefferson, broke against the Alien
and Sedition laws, and the courts have ever been vigilant in maintain-
ing the security of minorities in the enjoyment of the integrity of their
opinions and the rights of free speech.
The urge of the majority to impose its will upon disagreeable
minorities was perhaps more intense during those trying periods of
the World War than at any time since the enactment of the Four.-
teenth Amendment. In that day when a great friendly people awoke
to the fact that our country was the hunting ground for the spies of
a foreign people, the shock of realization was succeeded by a great
wave of indignation and prejudice which manifested itself in some
cases by intolerant legislation. In some of the states, notably Ne-
braska, Ohio and Iowa, laws were enacted proscribing the teaching
of any modem language in the grade schools of the state except Eng-
lish, and in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska,2 as also the case of Bartels
v. Iowa, the question of the validity of such statutes reached the Su-
preme Court for decision in June of 1923. In the following language
the Court applied the "life, liberty and due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the complete vindication of Mr. Meyer,
who had been convicted of teaching German to the children of a cer-
tain parochial school, called Zion, located in Hamilton County,
Nebraska:
"The problem for our determination is whether the stat-
ute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the lib-
erty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 'No state . . . shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.'
While this court has not attempted to define with exact-
ness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much
consideration, and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely free-
dom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and, generally, to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
2. 262 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 390.
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"The established doctrine is that this liberty may not be
interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public in-
terest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without rea-
sonable relation to some purpose within the competency of
the state to effect."
"The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of
any subject except in English; also the teaching of any other
language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed
the eighth grade, which is not usually accomplished before the
age of twelve."
"That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in
order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, men-
tally, and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection
of the Constitution extends to all,-to those who speak other
languages as well as those born with English on the tongue.
Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready
understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be
coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution,-a
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means."
"The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous
people with American ideals, prepared readily to understand
current discussions of civic matters, is easy to appreciate.
Unfortunate experiences during the late war, and aversion
toward every characteristic of truculent adversaries, were
certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means
adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of
the state, and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error.
The interference is plain enough, and no adequate reason
therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquillity has been
shown."
While it might be admitted that the analogy is not altogether
perfect, however, there would seem to be no serious difference in
principle between a law which forbids a teacher to impart the German
language to his students and a law which forbids the teaching of the
theory of Evolution; and this would apply with equal force even
although it should be admitted that Evolution is in contradiction to
those doctrines of religion which are held to be fundamental truths
Washington University Open Scholarship
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by a majority of the American people. For the test does not lie in
the fact that the opinions of the teacher may be right or that they
may be wrong; nor is it material whether they consist with the pre-
vailing views of the time. It is that his opinions belong to him and
that the right to freely express them is a liberty which is personal to
him. This doctrine not only guarantees the integrity of opinions
deemed at the time to be false or foolish, but it reflects the experience
of history that the majority or prevailing view is often happily dem-
onstrated to be error. Galileo was tried as an heretic and was con-
victed of the most abhorrent heresy for teaching and publishing the
theory that the planets revolve around the sun, which was regarded as
a wholly blasphemous contradiction of the tenth chapter of Joshua,
wherein is the record that God, at the supplication of Joshua, arrested
the movement of both sun and moon and caused them to stand still the
whilst Joshua and his comrades completed the important business
which they then had in hand. And yet the truth of Galileo's thesis
would be attested by every schoolboy in our day.
In the same century the eastern coast of the New World was
studded with colonies of refugees from nearly every country where the
old order prevailed-sturdy, indomitable men, willing to suffer the
dangers and hardships incident to the great adventure. And they have
woven into the fiber of our system of government those principles of
liberty of conscience which urged them to cross the seas, and which
have been zealously cultivated and valiantly guarded in the political
policies and written law of the country as the very foundation of our
freedom.
Perhaps the philosophy of the new world may be said to be essen-
tially equivalent to that of the wise old Sanhedrist, Gamaliel, who coun-
seled dismissal of the "false teachers" of his time with the profoundly
tolerant observation: "For if this counsel or this work be of men it
will come to naught; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest
haply (unhappily) ye be found even to fight against God."
A somewhat different phase of this constitutional question was
considered by the Supreme Court in the Oregon School case,3 in which
the opinion was delivered upon June 1, 1925. The right of the State
of Oregon to compel its people to send their children to public rather
than to private or parochial school of the same or equivalent standards
was drawn in question in that case from the standpoint of the school
and the parent rather than from that of the teacher, as in the German
language case. And yet the case is not without its value as a precedent
3. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 169 L. Ed. 688.
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here. In an emphatic opinion, based squarely upon the authority of
the Nebraska German language case, the Court held the Oregon statute
under consideration to be void and in obvious contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment. One clause will suffice to convey the drift
of the decision:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska,4 we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of children under their control. As
often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Consti-
tution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reason-
able relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state."
The opinion in this case was written by Justice McReynolds, who
also wrote the opinion of the Court in the Nebraska case, and, curi-
ously enough, it is in his native Tennessee that what appears to be the
same fight is being waged by the Modernist minority that was waged
by the German minority in Nebraska and the Catholic minority in
Oregon.
That a state in the exercise of its police power may punish those
whose abuse the freedom of speech vouchsafed in the Federal Consti-
tution by utterances "inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt
public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the public peace," is not open
to question.5
To this line of decisions may be added those cases falling within
the purview of the National Espionage Act, wherein utterances, the
natural tendency and probable effect of which are to obstruct the re-
cruiting of soldiers and sailors for the defense of the country in time
of war, are proscribed.'
But the foregoing classifications comprise the only limitations
upon the right of free speech which as yet have been sanctioned in our
law, and to validate a restriction upon the rights of the people to hold
and freely express their opinions upon a subject having no conceivable
relevancy to any of the dangers contemplated in these classifications
would be a substantial departure from the written law and previously
established policy of the country.
It would probably be both fruitless and tactless to hazard a fore-
cast of the decision in the Scopes case by the Supreme Court of Ten-
4. 262 U. S. 390, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 29 A. L. R. 1446, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625.
5. Gitlow v. New York, No. 17 Adv. Ops., U. S. Sup. Ct., 69 L. Ed. 708;
Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 277: Gilbert v. Minn., 254 U. S. 339.
6. Debs. v. U. S.. 249 U. S. 566.
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nessee when it reaches that body for argument. What effect a fervent
devotion to the doctrine of state's rights, a sincere popular conviction
that the dissemination of the doctrines of Evolution through the agency
of the public schools is a serious menace to the youth of the state, and the
well-known loyalty of the people of the South to accepted traditions of
the past, may have upon the decision of that court in such a case, no
one might safely venture a prediction.
Nor is it to be expected that the opinion of the bar of the country
should be altogether undivided as to the view which ought to be taken
of this case when it reaches the United States Supreme Court. But
it would seem wholly conservative to suggest the possibility, if not
the high probability, that the Court which decided the Nebraska and
the Oregon cases will not deem itself to be without precedent to declare
'the Tennessee statute unconstitutional and void, and that in doing so
the Court would in no wise contravene its established policy. In such
event, it must be apparent that the champion of Fundamentalism who
has rashly united the questions of Evolution and Law will suffer for
his strategy, and the one will be dragged down with the other. Mr.
Darrow and the other agnostic apologists for Scopes will not be slow
to claim the victory. It seems an unnecessary exposure.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/3
